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MILITARY (ARMY)

May Day Parade On Red Square

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EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Soviet External Relations. Publication of the transcript of Khrushchev's interview with the American publisher, Gardner Cowles represented the first Khrushchev statement on broad foreign policy issues since the Chinese Communist National Peoples Assembly was held in Peiping and the recent Supreme Soviet and CPSU Central Committee meetings in Moscow. It seemed apparent from the Cowles' interview that Khrushchev is intent on continuing to improve relations with the US, or at least to prevent such relations from deteriorating further. There was little in the interview which threw light on the current state of Soviet-Chinese relations except that Khrushchev indicated that the basic differences over "peaceful coexistence" and the approach to "building communism" remain wide. An interesting feature of the interview was the flexible position Khrushchev took on summitry. In effect he adopted the same position concerning various conditions for holding summit meetings as that publicly stated by President Kennedy. Although his statements about Germany-Berlin were less rosy that Gromyko's April 24 Supreme Soviet speech, they avoided bellicose language which would make the atmosphere worse for negotiations. And on disarmament Khrushchev followed the position taken in his April 12 letter to Macmillan, which virtually amounts to an admission that the USSR is not ready for preliminary general disarmament measures and accompanying control measures and that negotiations are being used primarily to serve propaganda ends.

Marshal Malinovsky's May Day speech, read from Lenin's mausoleum before the traditional parade began, followed the same line of disarmament. Malinovsky also contributed further to the Soviet effort to establish the myth that President Kennedy does not exclude the possibility of preventive nuclear war against the Communist bloc. The Soviet press has to date not reported what the President actually said on this score, but has twisted the President's meaning to serve as an argument for the USSR to dodge concrete disarmament measures.

2. Disarmament and Nuclear Testing. Although the Soviet press continues to publish reactions from abroad criticizing US atmospheric tests, there has been no mention of protest demonstrations or factory meetings in the Soviet Union itself. Nevertheless, several Soviet "public organizations" have published statements against US testing. These include the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Committee for the Defense of Peace, and the Committee of Women. Patriarch Alekseï also addressed a letter to President Kennedy on the subject.

While commentaries have asserted that the US Government must bear full responsibility for the "unreasonable action," criticisms in the main are directed against the alleged US industrial-military complex, US and imperialist monopolies and US aggressive circles. Soviet commentators continue to insist that the Western demand for an international control and inspection system would be tantamount to legalized espionage on Soviet territory and therefore unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Presumably to rationalize the possible resumption of Soviet testing, commentators cite Alsop to charge that

the President's remarks on a possible US initiative in a nuclear war threatens the Soviet Union with preventive war. Commentators then proceed to recall Gromyko's remarks in his April 24 speech before the Supreme Soviet that US and UK testing will confront the Soviet Union with the necessity of replying with tests of new types of nuclear weapons which are needed for strengthening the security of the Soviet Union and its allies.

3. Indonesia. The Soviet press has not been reporting the ups and downs of US sponsored efforts to get negotiations started between the Dutch and Indonesians on West Irian. However, Indonesian Foreign Minister arrived in Moscow on May 3 and was met by Marshal Zakharov, as well as by Foreign Minister Gromyko, thus clearly indicating there is a military angle to Subandrio's visit. Further Soviet military assistance to Indonesia undoubtedly will be used as pressure on the Dutch by the Indonesians and as support for the claim that the USSR is contributing to the "liberation" of West Irian by the Soviets.

Pravda published an account of Indonesian Communist leader Aidit's report to the recent Indonesian Communist Party Congress. Even from Pravda's carefully edited version of this speech it appeared that the Indonesian Communists are veering to the Chinese side in the Soviet-Chinese ideological dispute.

4. Berlin /Germany. The optimistic tenor of Gromyko's April 24 statements on the Berlin discussions was reflected even more strongly in a Moscow public lecture on April 30. The lecturer stated agreement could come very soon, but almost certainly will be achieved during this year. He attributed this rosy estimate to the alleged Western recognition of a shift in the correlation of power in favor of the USSR and bragged that in this "era of Khrushchev" the Soviet Union has become strong enough to deal any aggressor a staggering blow. The lecturer also rewiewed the four phases of the Berlin "probes" and praised the "American four-point plan" as reported in the Western press as "reasonable."

However, the publication of Khrushchev's interview with Gardner Cowles and two authoritative editorials published by Pravda April 29 and May 3 tended to temper the air of optimism which seemed present in Gromyko's Supreme Soviet assessment of the Berlin discussions. Khrushchev noted the encouraging progress achieved in the talks but reiterated in categoric terms that the occupation troops would have to be withdrawn before agreement is possible. Pravda April 29 published a lengthy commentary by N. Polyanov which concentrated on criticism of various Western plans under discussion for the increased NATO participation in the present US-UK monopoly of nuclear weapons. Polyanov charged American ambivalence on the diffusion of nuclear weapons is designed to exert pressure within the context of the Berlin discussions.

On May 3, Pravda published a three-column "Observer" editorial, entitled "Negotiations, But Not Playing At Negotiations," which clearly seemed designed to counter possible Western "misinterpretation" of optimistic Soviet statements on the Berlin discussions and to disabuse the West of any ideas that the negotiations can be protracted indefinitely. The article complained that

indications of Western rigidity are now re-emerging, citing Von Brentano's trip to Washington, the Secretary's April 26 press conference, and the Soviet canard about preventative war fabricated from the President's interview with Alsop. The Observer repeated Soviet demands Western troops be removed from West Berlin and criticized the Western access authority proposal as divorced from reality because it relegated the GDR to an inappropriate position as only one of 13 states represented.

5. Laos. General Kong Le appeared in Moscow for the May Day celebration and was given the most prominent attention of all foreign guests at the May Day parade in Red Square. Kong Le has given press and TV interviews, the main themes of which have been that Laos must have a neutral government because it borders on both "capitalist" and "socialist" countries and that he is impressed by what he has seen of the USSR, including its military might.

INTERNAL - POLITICAL

6. Leadership: Mopping Up After the April 23 Plenum. The week began with the publication on April 27 of the interview Khrushchev had granted Gardner Cowles on April 20. In it, Khrushchev denied that agriculture was the USSR's "problem No. 1", despite his troubled report of March 5 to the Central Committee Plenum, and said, "We believe that it is necessary to preserve certain proportions in the development of all branches of the economy" -- a murky tribute to the view which propounds continuing priority emphasis on heavy industry.

Khrushchev also said of MOLOTOV, KAGANOVICH, and VOROSHILOV that they "had behind them not a little that was good", his first kind words about Molotov and Kaganovich since the XXII Congress. He explicitly differentiated between the three old Stalinists and MALENKOV, who "was far from the same sort of figure as the first three." In his own way, Khrushchev appeared to be associating himself with the view of the majority of his colleagues in the Party leadership, whose preelection speeches (Despatch No. 969, May 3) took the line that the "group" had certainly made political mistakes, implying that it should not be accused of "crimes" and co-responsibility with STALIN for the "mass repressions" of the 1930's and '40's. Khrushchev's statement seemed to mark the end, for the time being, of the effort begun at the XXII Congress to make the "anti-Party group", or at least its leading troika, "answer to the Party and the people."

The other major political events of the week involved tidying up the loose ends left by the two important organizational measures taken by the April 23 Central Committee Plenum: the election of A. P. KIRILENKO as the twelfth full member of the Party Presidium and the release of I. V. SPIRIDONOV from the post of Secretary of the CC-CPSU.

On April 28, the press announced that the Bureau of the CC for the Russian Republic had held a conference "recently" (the Party had become chary of naming the dates connected with the April 23 Plenum "Despatch No. 973, May 4) and that "member of the Presidium of the CC-CPSU and First

Deputy Chairman of the Bureau of the CC-CPSU for the RSFSR A. P. Kirilenko" had participated in its work. The next day, the press announced that a Plenum of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Committee of the Party had met on April 28 and, "in connection with the confirmation of A. P. Kirilenko as a First Deputy Chairman of the Bureau of the CC-CPSU for the RSFSR", had released him from the post of First Secretary of the Oblast Committee. K. K. NIKOLAYEV, hitherto Chairman of the Oblast Executive Committee, the senior governmental body of the area, had been elected Oblast First Secretary in his place.

The use of the word "confirmation" raised the possibility that Kirilenko had already been functioning as First Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Bureau when the April 23 Plenum met. Since there had been no announcement of his appointment during the March 5-9 Plenum of the CC, it appeared that he had entered upon his bureau duties some time between March 10 and April 23.

With the April 23 Plenum and the Supreme Soviet session behind them, the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, according to an announcement in the press on April 30, proceeded to the formation of the Union Agriculture Committee, called for by their March 22 joint decree on agricultural reorganization. N. G. IGNATOV, who remains in the Council of Ministers as Chairman of the State Procurements Committee, became its Chairman. The membership slot designated for the Chairman of the State Procurements Committee was filled by Ignatov's First Deputy there, L. R. KORNIYETS.

The mopping-up operation was completed on May 3, when the Leningrad Oblast Committee of the Party met to hear a speech by Khrushchev and to release Spiridonov from the post of First Secretary and member of the Oblast Committee Bureau "in connection with his election as, and transfer to the work of, Chairman of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (Pravda, May 4).

Two things were of interest in the case of Spiridonov's fall. First, the participation of Khrushchev in the Leningrad Oblast Committee Plenum seemed superficially somewhat disproportionate to the occasion. And, secondly, the reason advanced for Spiridonov's removal was not likely to be regarded, even by the Soviet man-in-the-street, as a satisfactory explanation for his fall. The Chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet is not a full-time job.

The Leningrad Party organization -- with which are connected the names of KAMENEV, KIROV, VOZNESENSKY, ZHDANOV -- has always presented the Center with problems. Immediately after the XX CPSU Congress in 1956, it fruitlessly demanded the removal of Stalin's corpse from Lenin's mausoleum and the removal of his name from cities and public objects.

Spiridonov himself was a leader in the attack on the "anti-Party group". Perhaps he had gotten too far out in front on this issue. Alternatively, there was interest among observers in Moscow in a Central Committee criticism of the Leningrad City Party Committee for having failed to exercise Party control over a number of scientific-technical institutes in the city, including agricultural institutes which had clung to the now discredited theories of ley farming propounded by V. R. VILIAMS (Party Life, No. 8, 1962, pp. 31-35/signed to press April 17/; see also G. POPOV in Pravda, April 28).

But there was as yet no good explanation of Spiridonov's fall, following less than six months in the CC Secretariat.

On April 29, Khrushchev, accompanied by his First Deputy Chairman in the Council of Ministers, A. N. KOSYGIN, visited the artificial-fiber factory at Klin, near Moscow. The next day, back in Moscow, he received Queen ELIZABETH of the Belgians, a patron of the arts who was in Moscow to attend the Chaikovsky competitions.

On April 26, CC Secretary L. F. ILYICHEV returned to Moscow from Sofia, where he had sat in the Presidium of a Conference on Ideological Problems convoked on April 23 by the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

7. The Public Image: Precedence of Soviet Leaders in May Day Portrait Series. In the portrait series displayed in Moscow as part of the May Day decorations, the order of precedence given members of the CPSU-CC Presidium this year was Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Kozlov, Mikoyan, Kosygin, Suslov. (Embassy Despatch No. 966 of May 4). There were variations in the positions of Kosygin and Suslov, Kosygin more often than not enjoying the better position.

It is less easy to draw conclusions about the relative standing of the other six full members of the Presidium, but it is interesting that Kirilenko, who joined the Presidium only one week before May Day, seldom was at the extreme end of any series. In one, he was placed sixth among the twelve members of the Presidium.

Compared to the precedence indicated by May Day portraits displayed in 1961, there has been no change among the top four in the leadership. Suslov, however, has fallen below Kosygin to occupy sixth place; Kuusinen has exchanged places with Polyansky (now in eighth place) to occupy seventh place; and Podgorny has slipped from ninth place a year ago to twelfth place.

Usually divided into "Government" and "Party" groups, the eleven portrait series observed by the Embassy would yield the following composite picture.

"PARTY"	"GOVERNMENT"
Khrushchev	Brezhnev
Kozlov	Mikoyan
Suslov	Kosygin
Kuusinen	Polyansky
Kirilenko	Voronov*
Shvernik	Podgorny*

*Note: Inclusion of these two Party leaders on the "Government" side is obviously arbitrary.

8. May Day Competes with Russian Easter. The near coincidence of the Orthodox Easter (April 29) with May Day this year provided a striking comparison of the two events. The regime had decreed, three weeks earlier, that, "in response to the desires of the toilers," April 29 would be a working day

and the weekly day of rest would be deferred to April 30.

The prospect of a sleepless night did not deter thousands of the faithful from attending services in Orthodox churches throughout Moscow on the night of April 28-29. The turnout was as impressive as in previous years and the worshipers did not appear to be perturbed by instances of Komsomol rowdyism or occasional rough treatment by militiamen. In most instances, the young hecklers stayed outside the churches, but at the Church of St. Nicholas in Khamovniki a group of them, wearing red armbands, created a disturbance within the place of worship (A-864, May 1, 1962).

May Day celebrations in cities throughout the Soviet Union consisted of the customary "demonstrations" for which instructions had previously been published in the newspapers. In Moscow, the truculent speech of Marshal MALINOVSKY, who charged the United States with harboring aggressive designs, contrasted with the many slogans and banners stressing peaceful goals in industry and agriculture. Changeable weather remained clement just long enough to let the demonstrators in Moscow complete their three-hour parade without being soaked. By mid-afternoon, a steady rain had set in and everyone seemed glad that the performance was over. A more spontaneous celebration was observed that evening as gay and partially inebriated crowds filled the streats.

The saluting base atop Lenin's tomb displayed the usual -- plus Kirilenko, minus Spiridonov -- galaxy of the Party leadership and the high military command, with the addition of K. Ye. Voroshilov, who succeeded in mounting to the tomb-top this time, after having been restrained from doing so last November 7.

9. Sixteen Instances of Capital Punishment during April. During the past month, an unusually large number of death sentences and executions has been reported in the Soviet press. An informal survey of the central and republic-capital press revealed thirteen death sentences. Most of the victims were convicted of economic crimes, but three men in Kazakhstan were sentenced for the killing of a militiaman, and Izvestiya, on April 27, reported a rape case. In Tallin, a woman was sentenced to be shot for embezzlement.

The heightened attention being paid to crime by the press does not necessarily indicate an increase in the crime rate, but the strong remarks about "hooliganism" and "parasitism," made by N. S. Khrushchev at the XIV Komsomol Congress are a clear indication of the regime's serious concern over the problem of criminality.

MILITARY (ARMY)

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